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REINSURANCE LITIGATION: A PRIMER 
CHARLES F. CORCORAN, 111* 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, litigation between reinsurers and their reinsureds 
has been quite rare. As a result, the case law remains very sparse. 
However, intensifying economiC pressures have caused this situa­
tion to change rapidly, and in recent years participants in the rein­
surance industry have observed a dramatic increase in litigation. 
This article presents an overview of certain fundamental relation­
ships created by the reinsurance contract, as well as a review of the 
rules governing litigation when these relationships falter. 
I. REINSURANCE: TERMS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A. Definition and Purpose 
The essence of any reinsurance relationship is a written agree­
ment whereby an insurer (here the reinsured or "ceding" company) 
transfers ("cedes") to the reinsurer all or an agreed portion of the 
risk it has assumed from a third party or parties pursuant to a pri­
mary insurance contract with that third party. Under the contract 
of reinsurance, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the reinsured in 
return for a portion of the premium received from that third party.1 
"'[A] reinsurer is an insurance company's insurer."'2 
The reinsurer may in turn cede a portion of its reinsurance ob­
ligation to another reinsurer.3 Such an arrangement is known as a 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; 
A.B., Yale University, 1967; J.D., Yale University, 1971; Principal, Corcoran, Mallin & 
Aresco, P.e., One Commercial Plaza, Hartford, Connecticut. 
Professor Corcoran expresses his deep appreciation to Attorney Kimberly M. Can­
ning for her assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. See Transcontinental Underwriters Agency v. American Agency Underwriters, 
680 F.2d 298, 299 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982). 
2. Donald W. Rees & Carol E. Reese, Reinsurance: The Basics and Bad Faith 
Considerations, 39 FED'N OF INS. AND CORP. COUNS. Q. 323,323 (1989) (quoting Bart 
e. Sullivan, Reinsurance in the Age of Crisis, 38 FED'N OF INS. AND CORP. COUNS. Q. 3, 
4 (1987». 
3. Henry T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE 1,20 (Robert 
W. Strain ed., 1980). 
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"retrocession"-a reinsurance of reinsurance liability. If a retroces­
sion is itself reinsured, it is called the first retrocession, and the next 
retrocession becomes known as the second retrocession, with the 
process continuing in like manner. The "retrocedent" is the ceding 
reinsurer and the assuming reinsurer is the "retrocessionaire."4 
Each retrocessionaire is free to assume what it determines to be an 
appropriate amount of risk. 
The fundamental purpose of reinsurance is to spread the risk 
of loss from the original underwriter to another insurer.s Reinsur­
ance can contribute to the risk spreading objective in six basic ways: 
(1) it reduces the ceding insurer's net exposure to liability on indi­
vidual risks; (2) it protects the ceding insurer against the accumula­
tion of losses arising out of catastrophes and natural disasters; (3) it 
can reduce the total liabilities of the ceding insurer to a level appro­
priate to its premium volume; (4) it can alter the ceding insurer's 
mix of business, thereby reducing exposure in certain (possibly 
more hazardous) lines of business; (5) it can stabilize the overall 
operating results of the ceding insurer; and (6) it can assist the ced­
ing insurer in developing new concepts and lines of insurance.6 
Reinsurance for the ceding insurer is an essentially vertical re­
distribution of risk. Where an insurer is unwilling to assume the 
whole risk of the offered insurance, it may reinsure so much of its 
own risk as necessary to reduce its ultimate exposure to loss. Rein­
surers may, in turn, reinsure their own risk with others to reduce 
their exposures to loss.7 
It is important to understand that reinsurance is not coinsur­
ance. Rather, the reinsurance contract "is separate and distinct 
from the [original] policy agreement entered into between the ced­
ing company and its insured."8 The original insured is not a party 
to the reinsurance agreement and there is no privity of contract be­
tween the original insured and the reinsurer.9 However, "reinsur­
ance contracts may be drafted ... [so] as to create a liability on the 
4. Id. 
5. See Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance Co. of Am., 552 
N.E.2d 139, 142 (N.Y. 1990). 
6. Donald W. Rees et aI., Reinsurance Issues, in BAD FAITH LITIGATION AND 
INSURER VS. INSURER DISPUTES 1989, at 57, 72-73 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 497, 1989); see also Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 324-25. 
7. Kramer, supra note 3, at 6. 
8. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 324 (citing American Re-Insurance Co. v. In­
surance Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 444,453 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 696 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
9. Id. 
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part of the reinsurer ... in favor of the original insured."lo This 
contractual exception to the privity rule is known as a "cut 
through" clause. 
A cut through clause permits an original insured to bring an 
action directly against a reinsurer.ll Without it, an insured cannot 
prevail on a claim against a reinsurer when the insurer fails to pay 
for losses covered under the original insurance policy.12 Thus, an 
insured realizes the primary benefit of a cut through clause when an 
insurer becomes insolvent. The cut through clause enables the in­
sured to look directly to the reinsurer for payment and to avoid 
dealing with the estate or liquidator of a bankrupt insurer.B How­
ever, the reinsurer's liability to the insured is limited to the amount 
of its share of the reinsured's obligation.14 
Generally speaking, reinsurers will be reluctant to incorporate 
a cut through clause into a reinsurance contract,unless substantial 
premiums are involved. However, a reinsurer might agree to the 
presence of a cut through clause to improve the marketability of its 
client's (the reinsured's) policies and thereby generate more rein­
surance business.15 Additionally, a reinsurer might agree to a cut 
through clause when a mortgagee is unwilling to accept the policies 
of certain insurers as protection for collateral. This can occur when 
(1) the insurer does not have a satisfactory insurance industry rat­
ing, (2) the insurer is financially unstable or weak, or (3) the insurer 
is a new business or too small as compared with other insurers in 
the industry. Under these circumstances, the cut through will sat­
isfy the mortgagee's concerns because it allows the mortgagee to 
seek reimbursement directly from the reinsurer if the insurer be­
comes insolvent.16 
B. Categories of Reinsurance: Facultative and Automatic 
There are two fundamental varieties of reinsurance contracts: 
10. O'Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. 1959); see also China Union 
Lines, Ltd. v. American Marine Underwriters, Inc., 755 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1985) (not­
ing that the reinsurer may agree to be directly liable to the original insured). 
11. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 337. 
12. See Credit Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 
617,623-24 (9th Cir. 1987). 
13. See generally Kramer, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
14. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 340. 
15. Robert A. Baker, The Purpose of Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE 33, 46-47 
(Robert W. Strain ed., 1980); James D. Koehnen, Administration and Maintenance of 
Business in Force, in REINSURANCE 491, 508-09 (Robert W. Strain ed., 1980). 
16. Baker, supra note 15, at 46-47; Koehnen, supra note 15, at 508-09. 
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facultative and automatic, or "treaty."17 Under a facultative rein­
surance agreement, the ceding insurer contracts with the reinsurer 
on a policy-by-policy basis. The reinsurer may choose whether to 
accept or reject the opportunity to reinsure the policy in question, 
or it may stipulate on what terms it will agree to reinsure.1s A rein­
surer will issue a separate certificate of facultative reinsurance for 
each policy it reinsures. Frequently, a number of reinsurers will is­
sue certificates of facultative reinsurance, each assuming a portion 
of the liability for a single policy.t9 
By contrast, under an automatic or treaty reinsurance agree­
ment, the reinsurer provides reinsurance on all policies of a certain 
type underwritten by the reinsured.20 The reinsurer does not have 
the option of reinsuring specific policies, but rather reinsures a cer­
tain percentage of all classes or specified classes of the reinsured's 
business. For example, automatic or treaty insurance might provide 
that a reinsurer reinsures all of an insurer's homeowners' policies 
within a particular region for a period of one year.21 
"Both treat[y] and facultative reinsurance agreements may be 
issued on either an excess of loss or pro rata basis."22 Under an 
excess of loss agreement, the reinsurer insures only those losses in 
excess of a stated retention or deductible. The concept is similar to 
that of a "deductible" in a primary insurance policy, where an in­
sured pays a certain amount of money towards a loss before the 
insurer becomes responsible for payment. Under an excess of loss 
certificate of reinsurance, the reinsurer pays the amount of loss 
which exceeds a predetermined amount paid by the primary or ced­
ing carrier. Under a pro rata agreement, the insurer and reinsurer 
share both premiums and losses according to a predetermined 
. proportion.23 
Typically, reinsurance is a contract of indemnity rather than lia­
17. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Cologne Reinsurance Co. of Am., 
552 N.E.2d 139, 142 (N.Y. 1990); see also Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 325. 
18. Sumitomo Marine, 552 N.E.2d at 142; see also Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 
326. 
19. Christiana General Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 150, 152 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
20. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 325-26. 
21. See Mary Ann Overholt, Ethical Considerations in Reinsurance, in RESOLV­
ING REINSURANCE DISPUTES: CONTRAcrs, ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, at 109, 113-14 
(ABA Tort and Ins. Practice Section 1989). 
22. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 326. 
23. Id. 
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bility.24 This means that generally a reinsurer will pay reinsurance 
proceeds to a ceding company "only after the ceding company has 
paid for a loss covered by the underlying policy."25 Because the 
occasion of a loss is not enough in and of itself to trigger a rein­
surer's liablility, litigation involving a reinsurance contract is likely 
to take either of the following forms: (1) a reinsurer's action for a 
declaratory judgment or (2) a reinsured's action against the rein­
surer for the latter's refusal to indemnify. 
II. CASE LAW ON REINSURANCE 
A. Rules of Construction 
Reinsurance contracts are agreements negotiated between in­
surers. Therefore, both parties to the agreement are presumed to 
have a degree of sophistication regarding insurance contracts. As a 
result, courts will generally enforce the written terms contained in 
reinsurance certificates and treaties without reference to contra-in­
surer rules of construction.26 For example, in Great American In­
surance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance CO.,27 the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the "general rule [the 
contra-insurer rule of construction] should not apply when both the 
insured and insurer are 'large insurance companies long engaged in 
far-flung activities in that field of economic activity.' "28 
But while the rules of construction protecting unsophisticated 
24. China Union Lines, Ltd. v. American Marine Underwriters, Inc., 755 F.2d 26, 
30 (2d Cir. 1985); Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 323-24. 
25. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 324. 
26. Contra-insurer rules are those rules of construction which resolve ambiguities 
in an insurance contract in favor of the insured and against the insurer who drafted the 
contract. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Cole, 809 F.2d 891, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
For example, courts will resolve uncertainties about coverage in favor of the most 
inclusive interpretation for the benefit of the insured. Vargas, 714 P. Supp. at 724; Holz 
Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055, 1063 (Cal. 1975). Likewise, exclu­
sionary clauses will be interpreted narrowly. Thomas V. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual 
Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1974). Ambiguity in the language of the policy will be 
resolved by examining a term in the insurance contract as it is understood by a lay 
person, and not as it is understood by persons in the insurance industry. Stainless, Inc. 
v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 418 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 406 N.E.2d 490 
(N.Y. 1980). Finally, insurance policies are interpreted according to the reasonable ex­
pectations of a lay person, notwithstanding the clarity or ambiguity of the policy lan­
guage. Id.; Vargas, 714 F. Supp. at 720. 
27. 481 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1973). 
28. Id. at 954 (quoting Boston Ins. Co. v. Fawcett, 258 N.E.2d 771, 776 (Mass. 
1970». 
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insureds are disregarded, general rules of contract interpretation 
still apply. Therefore, when contract language is ambiguous, the 
court will interpret the ambiguity against the party that drafted the 
document.29 For example, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Central Na­
tional Insurance Co., the United States District Court for the Dis­
trict of Connecticut held that a notice clause which referred to 
claims "likely to involve reinsurance" raised an "ambiguity [that] 
must be construed against [the reinsurer] which drafted the [facul­
tative] Reinsurance Certificate. "30 
B. Liability: Following the Fortunes 
Many reinsurance contracts contain what is known as a "follow 
the fortunes" clause.31 A follow the fortunes clause typically pro­
vides that "all claims covered by the reinsurance, when settled by 
the reinsured, are binding on the reinsurer,"32 or that "the liability 
of the reinsurer follows that· of the reinsured. "33 When such a 
clause is made part of the reinsurance contract, the reinsurer must 
follow the fortunes of the ceding company-meaning that the rein­
surer is bound by any settlement or judgment under the original 
policy that the ceding company paid in good faith and in accord­
ance with the terms of the reinsurance certificate. 
The principle behind the follow the fortunes doctrine is to pre­
clude reinsurers from denying payment on a reinsured's good faith 
settlement when coverage of the underlying claim under the origi­
nal policy is undisputed and the reinsured has honored the terms of 
its contract with the reinsurer.34 When coverage is disputed, a fol­
low the fortunes clause will bind the reinsurer only when the ceding 
company settled a claim which was "reasonably encompassed 
within the bounds of the underlying policy."35 
29. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D. 
Conn. 1990). 
30. Id. at 528. 
31. Rees & Reese, supra note 2, at 341. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 322 
N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (Sup. 1971); see also Mentor Ins. Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Brannkasse, 996 
F.2d 506, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1993). A reinsurer is not bound under a "follow the fortunes" 
clause by any settlement made by the ceding company which is outside the scope of the 
original policy. A reinsurer is relieved of liability to its cedent if it can show that a good 
faith settlement was clearly outside the scope of the policy reinsured or that the settle­
ment was tainted by fraud or bad faith which prejudiced the reinsurer. See American 
Ins. Co. v. North Am. Co. for Property & Casualty Ins., 697 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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A reinsurer recently challenged this tenet, in Mentor Insurance 
Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Brannkasse.36 The reinsurer argued that the fol­
low the fortunes doctrine did not require the reinsurer to pay be­
cause although the loss eventually was deemed a constructive total 
loss, the original claim was not for a total loss, as required by the 
reinsurance contract.37 In rejecting that argument, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a rein­
surer is obligated to follow the fortunes of a ceding company and 
pay its portion of the claim whenever the ceding company settles 
the claim in good faith and satisfies the conditions of the reinsur­
ance contract. 
The controversy in Mentor arose from an insurance policy is­
sued by Oil Insurance Ltd. ("OIL") for hull and machinery damage 
on an oceangoing oil rig. The policy also provided for a one million 
dollar deductible, which Mentor separately insured.38 A. I.G. Oil 
Rig, Inc. ("AIG"), and other reinsurers, reinsured a portion of the 
Mentor policy under a contract which provided that the reinsurance 
was "[s]ubject to all terms, clauses, conditions and settlements as 
original but only to cover in respect of Total and/or Constructive 
and/or Arranged and/or Compromised Total Loss of Unit."39 
When the oil rig sank, the loss was clearly in excess of the deducti­
ble on the OIL insurance policy. Mentor paid its policy limit, while 
OIL adjusted the loss. OIL ultimately settled the claim with the 
insured as a "constructive total 10ss."40 Subsequently, Mentor 
sought reinsurance proceeds from AIG, but AIG denied 
payment.41 
AIG's refusal to pay was based on a dispute as to whether the 
oil rig was a total loss under the total-loss-only reinsurance cover­
age.42 The insured originally submitted its claim on a partial loss 
basis. AIG argued that the loss could not have been covered by the 
reinsurance contract because it was in fact a partial loss, despite the 
ceding company's settlement and classification of the loss as a "con­
structive total loss. "43 
The Second Circuit disagreed with AIG, and affirmed that part 
36. 996 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1993). 
37. Id. at 517. 

3S. Id. at 507. 

39. Id. at 50S. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 509. 
42. Id. at 514. 
43. Id. 
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of the district court's decision which adopted the following findings 
of a special master: (1) the loss was covered under both the OIL 
and Mentor policies;44 (2) OIL's settlement of the loss as construc­
tive and total was an arms-length transaction, untainted by fraud, 
collusion, or bad faith;45 (3) Mentor's settlement of the loss was an 
arms-length transaction, untainted by fraud, collusion, or bad 
faith;46 and (4) the custom and practice of the reinsurance industry 
required a reinsurer to follow the fortunes of the ceding company 
when the latter settled a claim in good faith, without fraud, and in 
accordance with the reinsurance contract.47 According to the Sec­
ond Circuit OIL's settlement of the claim as a constructive total loss 
actuated the risk assumed by the deductible policy and triggered 
the total loss risk ceded to the reinsurers.48 
Another key aspect of the follow the fortunes doctrine is that if 
the terms of the reinsurance contract differ from the terms of the 
underlying policy, the terms of the reinsurance contract contro1.49 
For example, in Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. ,50 the Second Circuit considered whether the plaintiff as 
reinsurer was required to indemnify Aetna for defense costs in ex­
cess of the policy limits set forth in the certificate of reinsurance.51 
Bellefonte did not disagree that it was obliged to follow Aetna's 
fortunes as to the actual settlement figure of the basic claim. But 
Aetna contended that the reinsurance certificates also required 
Bellefonte and the other plaintiff reinsurers to follow Aetna's for­
tunes and indemnify it for its excess costs of defense.52 Aetna ar­
gued that the plaintiff reinsurers were obliged to pay beyond the 
certificate limits when the extra defense costs were reasonable and 
expended in good faith on the settlement of a dispute covered by 
the underlying policy.53 
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that Aetna's interpreta­
tion of the provision at issue "would strip the limitation clause and 
other conditions of all meaning; the reinsurer would be obliged 
44. Id. at 514-15. 
45. Id. at 515. 
46. Id. at 517. 
47. Id. at 516-17. 
48. Id. at 517. 
49. See, e.g., Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 903 
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 912. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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merely to reimburse the insurer for any and all funds paid."54 The 
court held that the follow the fortunes doctrine did not permit 
Aetna to collect from the reinsurer any defense costs in excess of 
the express cap set forth in thecertificates.55 
Logically, then, the follow the fortunes doctrine does not give 
rise to new reinsurer liabilities outside the specifications of the con­
tract, even when the loss occurs within the underlying insurance 
policy.56 For example, if the loss occurs within the policy period but 
not within the period provided in the facultative certificate or 
treaty, the reinsurer will not be liable.57 
C. Dispute Resolution Through Arbitration 
Most reinsurance contracts require that disputes between the 
reinsurer and reinsured be settled by arbitration. Provisions calling 
for arbitration are generally strictly enforced. 58 Therefore, when a 
party agrees to include an arbitration provision in the contract, it 
forfeits the opportunity to resolve in court any disputes arising out 
of that contract.59 In addition, after an arbitrator has ruled, a 
"court is compelled to confirm [the ruling] ... unless the arbitrator 
was corrupt or thoroughly incompetent. "60 
The Federal Arbitration Act61 ("FAA") demonstrates a strong 
federal policy fostering arbitration.62 This policy, which obligates 
federal courts to strictly enforce arbitration agreements, has been 
applied in the reinsurance arena.63 Under the FAA, courts have 
the power to order a stay of the proceedings before them while ar­
bitration is pending.64 In Clarendon National Insurance Co. v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co. ,65 the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York exercised this right and ordered 
a stay of the proceedings between a reinsurer and a reinsured pur­
54. Id. at 913. 
55. Id. Accord Unigard Security Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 
1049, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1993). 
56. Clifford H. Schoenberg, Follow the Fortunes: The Reinsurance Contract Con­
trols, 3 MEALEY'S LIT. REp. (REINSURANCE) 17 (1992). 
57. Id. 
58. Michael J. Sehr et aI., Excess, Surplus Lines, and Reinsurance: Recent Devel­
opments, 27 TORT AND INS. L.J. 227, 237 (1992). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 238. 
61. 9 U.S.c. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
62. Sehr, supra note 58, at 237. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 238. 
65. 1992 WL 122781 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1992). 
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suant to an arbitration provision in the reinsurance contract.66 The 
court ruled that the disputes between Clarendon and Transamerica 
were "clearly within the scope of [the reinsurance agreement]" and 
therefore proper for arbitration.67 The FAA also permits a court to 
order arbitration when there has been an apparent "failure, neglect, 
or refusal" by the parties to comply with the agreement.68 In addi­
tion, federal courts must order arbitration if the reinsurance con­
tract provides for arbitration and either party demands it.69 
However, there is an exception to the rule requiring that arbi­
tration provisions be strictly enforced. This exception applies when 
an insurance company has become insolvent and its estate or liqui­
dator is attempting to recover reinsurance proceeds. Two state 
courts recently dealt with this very issue, with markedly different 
results. 
In Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co.7o, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that the state liquidator of an insolvent insurance 
company was not obligated to settle the insurance company's claims 
against foreign reinsurers by arbitration. The reinsurers claimed 
that the court was required to order arbitration pursuant to the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.71 The court of appeals, however, re­
jected that argument and ruled that Article II of the Convention 
required a liquidator to arbitrate only those claims which were ca­
pable of resolution by arbitration.72 The court found that the dis­
pute in question was not proper for arbitration because, under New 
York law,73 courts have exclusive jurisdiction over liquidation pro­
ceedings.74 Therefore, the state liquidator had no authority to place 
the insolvent insurance company's claims before an arbitrator. 
In sharp contrast to the Corcoran decision, a Pennsylvania 
court considered an arbitration agreement and ruled that under 
Pennsylvania law, agreements to arbitrate are valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable.75 In Foster v. Philadelphia Manufacturers, the 
66. Id. at *1. 
67. Id. 
68. Sehr, supra note 58, at 238. 
69. [d. 
70. 567 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991). 
71. Id. at 970 (relying on United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.J. 2517 (June 10, 1958». 
72. Id. at 973. 
73. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 7417 (McKinney 1985). 
74. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 973. 
75. Foster v. Philadelphia Mfrs., 592 A.2d 131, 133 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). 
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court rejected the Corcoran decision, noting that Pennsylvania, un­
like New York, did. not give courts exclusive jurisdiction over pro­
ceedings involving insolvent insurance companies.76 As a result, 
the Foster court held that Pennsylvania's insurance commissioner 
was obligated to arbitrate the insurance company's claims.77 As the 
number of insurer insolvencies increases, enforcement of arbitra­
tion provisions is likely to remain at the forefront of reinsurance 
contract disputes.78 
D. Insolvent Reinsureds 
A reinsurer cannot deny reinsurance coverage simply because 
the reinsured becomes insolvent. In most cases, reinsurance con­
tracts provide that upon insolvency, reinsurance proceeds are paya­
ble to the successor of the ceding insurer "without diminution 
because of such insolvency."79 Some reinsurers have claimed that 
such language is too restrictive because it precludes reinsurers from 
offsetting liabilities to the insolvent insurer by the amount that the 
insurer owes to the reinsurer.8o 
Recently, iI). Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Corcoran (In re Mid­
land Insurance Co. ),81 the New York Court of Appeals held that 
Kemper Reinsurance Company ("Kemper"), a reinsurer, could off­
set reinsurance proceeds due to Midland Insurance Company 
("Midland"), its reinsured, against amounts Midland owed to Kem­
per under an entirely unrelated contract.82 Midland had negotiated 
a reinsurance treaty with Kemper whereby Kemper agreed to pro­
vide reinsurance for certain policy lines.83 Several years later, Mid­
land issued an excess products liability insurance policy to Playtex, 
Inc. and reinsured seventy-five percent of the risk under a faculta­
tive certificate from Kemper. The reinsurance contract contained a 
clause which stated in pertinent part: 
In the event of the insolvency of [Midland], reinsurance under 
this Agreement shall be payable by [Kemper] on the basis of the 
76. [d. 
77. Id. at 134. 
78. Sehr, supra note 58, at 237-38. 
79. See, e.g., William G. Clark, Facultative Reinsurance: Reinsuring Individual 
Policies, in REINSURANCE 117, 134 (Robert W. Strain ed., 1980). 
80. James V. Schibley, The Life Reinsurance Contract, in RESOLVING REINSUR­
ANCE DISPUTES, CONTRACTS, ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, at 1, 17 (ABA Tort and Ins. 
Practice Section 1989). 
81. 590 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 (N.Y. 1992). 
82. [d. at 1190. 
83. [d. at 1188. 
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liability of [Midland] under the Reinsurance Agreement, without 
diminution because ofsuch insolvency, directly to [Midland] or its 
liquidator, receiver or statutory successor, except as otherwise 
specified in the statutes of any state having jurisdiction of the 
insolvency proceedings.84 
Thus, the reinsurance contract required Kemper to pay reinsurance 
proceeds regardless of Midland's solvency.85 
When Midland became insolvent in 1986, it owed Kemper un­
paid premiums on the reinsurance treaty. Kemper, in turn, owed 
Midland an estimated three quarters of a million dollars in reinsur­
ance proceeds for losses under the Playtex contract. Kemper at­
tempted to offset Midland's unpaid premiums under the treaty 
against the amount Kemper owed Midland under the Playtex con­
tract, but Midland objected.86 Midland's liquidator argued that the 
respective debts could not be offset because (1) they arose out of 
separate and distinct transactions; (2) the insolvency clause in the 
Playtex contract precluded Kemper from offsetting the debts; and 
(3) the debts were owed by, and payable to, different people.87 
The court rejected the liquidator's reasoning and found that 
mutual debts need not necessarily arise from the same transac­
tion.88 In so ruling, the court looked to the legislative history of 
section 420 of New York's insurance statute (the predecessor to sec­
tion 7427, allowing offsets of mutual debts and credits)89 and noted 
that section 420 "was patterned after the conventional provisions 
commonly found in insolvency laws and the provisions of the Bank­
ruptcy ACt."90 The court then noted that the bankruptcy laws per­
mit offsets arising out of different transactions. In addition, the 
court found that the right to offset was an important one because 
"it provides a form of security to insurers."91 As a result, the court 
concluded that the "contractual obligations between Kemper Re 
and Midland constitute[d] 'mutual debts' for purposes of offset 
under section 7427 of the Insurance Law despite the fact that they 
[arose] out of two separate and distinct transactions. "92 
The court declined to follow the liquidator's argument that the 
84. Id. at 1191 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
85. Id. at 1191-92. 
86. Id. 
87. [d. 
88. Id. at 1189-91. 
89. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7427 (McKinney 1985) (formerly § 420). 
90. Midland, 590 N.E.2d at 1189. 
91. [d. at 1191. 
92. [d. 
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insolvency provision in the Playtex agreement forbade offset. The 
relevant language stated that the reinsurance monies would be ten­
dered to the liquidator" 'without diminution because of such insol­
vency."'93 The court ruled that the liquidator had "misconstrued 
the purpose of the insolvency c1ause,"94 and observed that the insol­
vency provision merely obligates the reinsurer to indemnify the liq­
uidator for its share under the agreement even if the insolvent 
insurer had not made payments to the insured.95 The court then 
noted that "liquidation cannot place the liquidator in a better posi­
tion than the insolvent company he takes over, authorizing him to 
demand that which the company would not have been entitled to 
prior to liquidation."96 The court therefore held that Kemper did 
not lose its right to offset treaty premiums against monies due pur­
suant to the terms of the facultative certificate "merely because a 
liquidation order was entered."97 
CONCLUSION 
Reinsurance is a most imaginative and flexible concept. It al­
lows smaller insurers to become competitive with bigger ones, and 
enables bigger insurers to groW.98 For centuries the reinsurance in­
dustry operated on handshakes, without the need to tum to the 
courts for intervention. But as we move to the end of this century, 
with the enormous financial stresses created by huge environmental 
liabilities, changing weather patterns, astonishing jury verdicts, and 
increasing insurer insolvencies, we see this picture rapidly changing. 
Our courts are now confronted with the challenge of compre­
hending this highly complex area of insurance sufficiently well to 
insure fair and reasonable solutions to the disputes of its 
participants. 
93. Id. (quoting the Insurance contract). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1192. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Kramer, supra note 3, at 30-31. 
